**Specifications Table**TableSubject area*Business Management*More specific subject area*Corporate Governance*Type of data*Tables and figures*How data was acquired*Secondary data (Manually extracted from banks' annual reports)*Data format*Raw, analysed*Experimental factors*Sample consists of eight deposit money banks in Nigeria*Experimental features*Descriptive statistics, and panel data regression*Data source location*Lagos, Nigeria*Data accessibility*Data included in this article*

**Value of the data**•Data was manually extracted from selected banks׳ annual reports, and stock market reports. It comprises the most expansive and currently available data since the Nigerian banking consolidation exercise (2006--2016).•Dataset on managerial incentives can be used to explore other research interests -- such as Executive Pay and Banking Risk, CEO-employee pay ratio, Determinants of CEO pay, CEO pay and Environmental Performance etc.•Sourcing data on managerial incentives, and historical stock market prices for research is quite challenging in a developing country like Nigeria, hence scientific conclusions can be drawn from the dataset.•The dataset can be used by academia, managers, board, investors, and regulators to identify specific managerial incentives as predictors of bank performance.

1. Data {#s0005}
=======

The dataset contains raw descriptive and inferential statistics. Panel data regression analysis was used to test the relationships between managerial incentives and bank performance. [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"} provides data about the descriptive statistics for the study variables. [Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"} provides data on correlations and variance inflation factors for the variables used in the empirical analysis, while [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} provides data on the estimates of the panel regression specification.Table 1Descriptive statistics -- managerial incentives and bank performance.Table 1CEORCEOTBCREMBCTCSOBGDRROAROETBQNIM*NGN ׳mYearsNGN ׳mYearsNo. ('m)%%%No.%*Mean63.804.4314.883.70267.0011.672.1314.731.3413.99Median65.403.508.413.0073.8712.922.3514.720.9613.58Maximum205.0019.00201.0011.002,690.0033.335.9436.565.7732.39Minimum6.501.000.401.000.004--(2.26)(20.89)0.095.81Std. Dev.45.503.6823.152.68524.0010.631.5211.051.304.13[^1]Table 2Correlation -- managerial incentives and bank performance.Table 2Variables123456789101. lnBGDR12. lnBCT−0.0313. lnBCREM0.090.24\*14. lnCEOR0.36\*\*\*0.110.43\*\*\*15. lnCSO0.33\*\*0.06−0.020.0216. lnCEOT−0.220.16−0.12−0.060.24\*17. lnNIM−0.29\*\*−0.19−0.29\*\*−0.54\*\*\*−0.160.218. lnROA−0.02−0.25\*−0.120.170.060.220.2419. lnROE0.04−0.31\*\*−0.25\*0.080.070.140.31\*\*0.93\*\*\*110. lnTBQ−0.2−0.41\*\*\*−0.34\*\*−0.28\*\*−0.23\*0.110.63\*\*\*0.59\*\*\*0.64\*\*\*1V.I.F**1.441.121.331.431.261.26**[^2]*Source:* Researcher׳s Field Survey (2017).Table 3Panel regression -- managerial incentives and bank performance.Table 3VariableDescriptionROAROETBQNIMCConstant4.5477.64616.2496.682(−2.21)(3.408)(8.039)(8.854)LCEORCEO remuneration0.1340.084−0.436\*\*\*−0.206\*\*\*(−1.26)(0.720)(−4.147)(−5.240)LCEOTCEO Tenure0.1810.1110.0580.069(−1.68)(0.945)(0.546)(1.742)LBGDRBoard Gender0.0400.0550.1110.054(−0.18)(0.232)(0.583)(0.767)LBCTBoard Chair Tenure0.001−0.0160.0360.108\*\*(−0.01)(−0.122)(0.315)(2.530)LCSOCEO Share Ownership−0.074−0.081−0.192\*\*\*−0.001(−1.24)(−1.252)(−3.321)(−0.067)LBCREMBoard Chair Remuneration−0.326\*\*\*−0.328\*\*−0.349\*\*\*−0.045(−2.74)(−2.525)(−3.077)(−1.052)R^2^0.6750.6120.7960.695Adjusted R^2^0.5800.4990.7390.610F-Stat7.0875.39813.9888.185Prob (F-Stat)0.0000.0000.0000.000[^3]*Source:* Researcher׳s Field Survey (2017).

2. Experimental design, materials and methods {#s0010}
=============================================

Data for the study on managerial incentives were manually extracted from the annual reports (directors' profile, and notes to the accounts) of the selected banks, while performance measures were computed based on the banks' financials and online stock market reports. The eight (8) deposit money banks selected for the study were the final sample after meeting the evaluation criteria which included among others the availability of data for the period under study. The banks are from both Tier 1 and Tier 2 categories, while five (5) of the banks control seventy percent (70%) of the market share. The study identified six (6) components of managerial incentives from literature provided by Refs. [@bib1], [@bib2], [@bib5], [@bib6], [@bib7], [@bib8]. These are: CEOs Remuneration (CEOR), CEOs Tenure (CEOT), Board Chairman׳s Remuneration (BCREM), Board Chairman׳s Tenure (BCT), CEO׳s Share Ownership (CSO), and Board Gender (BGDR). Four proxies of bank performance adopted include: Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Tobin׳s Q (TBQ), and Net Interest Margin (NIM) as used in Refs. [@bib8], [@bib9], [@bib10]. A panel data regression comprising consistent fixed effect estimates, efficient random effect estimates and Hausman test was adopted to analyse the dataset. This is consistent with studies in Refs. [@bib3], [@bib4], [@bib5]. Preliminary tests on analysis of measures involving correlation matrix, variance inflation factors to test multi-collinearity was performed. The data was analysed using the Eviews software Version 9. Econometric analysis was adopted to determine the nature of the relationship between managerial incentives and bank performance using the following panel regression model:$${BPerf}_{it} = \beta 0_{it} + \beta 1{lnCEOR}_{it} + \beta 2{lnCEOT}_{it} + \beta 3{lnBCREM}_{it} + \beta 4{lnBCT}_{it} + \beta 5{lnCSO}_{it} + \beta 6{lnBGDR}_{it} + U_{it}$$where,BPerf=Bank performance (with ROA, ROE, NIM, and TBQ as proxy)β0=ConstantΒ1- β6=Parameter of the explanatory variable represented as:lnCEOR=CEO remuneration (natural log)lnCEOT=CEO tenure (natural log)lnBCREM=Board Chair remuneration (natural log)lnBCT=Board Chair Tenure (natural log)lnCSO=CEO Share Ownership (natural log)lnBGDR=Board Gender (natural log)μ=disturbance termsi=8 banks in the sample; andt=11 time period.

The estimates for the regression are presented in [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"}.

[Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"} presents the descriptive statistics on the managerial incentives measures, and the bank performance measures. The maximum CEO tenure of 19 years was a sunset observation recorded at the inception of the implementation of the revised corporate governance code. The code prescribes a tenure limit of 10 years subject to a maximum of two-terms. The reported maximum value of NGN 201 million as Board Chairman Remuneration is also attributed to the sunset effect prior to the implementation of the revised code of corporate governance in the banking sector. Female representation on bank boards was low at an average of 11.67%, but the rate is comparable to other studies.

Results of the correlation and variance inflation factors in [Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"} show no evidence of multicollinearity.

Following from [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"}, three managerial incentives show a negative significant influence on bank performance in selected deposit money banks in Nigeria: Board Chair remuneration (on ROA, ROE, and TBQ); CEO remuneration (on TBQ and NIM), and CEO Share ownership (on TBQ). Conversely, Board Chair Tenure showed a positive significant effect on bank performance (NIM). These estimates have managerial implications. As banks seek to improve their financial performance, the role of managerial incentives needs to be given a special consideration in order to identify what creates or erodes shareholders׳ value. The dataset provides useful insights for board remuneration and nomination committees, investors, and regulators to understand the influence of managerial incentives in enhancing a deposit money bank׳s performance.
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[^1]: NGN --Nigerian Naira, 'm -- millions.

[^2]: \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.

[^3]: \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The *t*-statistics (reported in parenthesis).
